Bank-Runs, Contagion and Credit Easing

Bank-Runs, Contagion and Credit Easing
(co-authored with Manuel Amador)


We present a macroeconomic model of financial crises in which banks are subject to self-fulfilling runs. An individual bank is vulnerable to a run when a loss of investors’ confidence triggers deposit withdrawals and leads the bank to default on its obligations. We characterize how this vulnerability depends on its own leverage as well as macroeconomic fundamentals. We show that bank-runs can be contagious and spread out across the entire financial system. A key policy insight is that the effectiveness of credit easing depends critically on whether a financial crisis is driven by fundamentals or loss of confidence.

Date et heure: 
Jeudi 19 novembre 2020, 16:30
Banque nationale de Belgique, KU Leuven, UAntwerpen, UCL, UGent, ULB, UNamur et VUB
Javier Bianchi
Prix d'inscription: