

Is the Eurozone ready for the next crisis?

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Outline

1. Why was the last financial crisis so bad?
2. What has been fixed, what is now worse, what remains to do?
3. Concluding remarks

Why was the last crisis so bad?

1. Initial conditions and preventive arm
 - Unsustainable current account deficits and real exchange rates
 - Large public debts
2. Amplifying mechanisms
 - Bank-sovereign doom loop
 - Redenomination risk and political reactions
3. Not enough private risk sharing / market discipline?
 - No ESDRM => not enough debt restructuring

Why was the last crisis so bad?

4. No fiscal tools for managing a sudden stop
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1. Initial conditions and prevention

- Large legacy debts are THE main stumbling block preventing EZ reforms and main source of fragility
 - They ought to be reduced urgently. How?
- Mkt Discipline alone is too late and too sudden
- Institutional constraints matter
 - 2017 Deficit: EZ: <1% US: 5% Japan: 4.3% UK: 2%
 - D/Y: EZ 87% (↓ by 4 pp in 4Y) US: 108%
- But Fiscal Compact should be strengthened (EFB 2018)
 - Commission was too lenient in past few years
 - Rules too complex
 - Sanctions and enforcement


How to strengthen the Fiscal Compact

- Assessment delegated to non-political body (independent arm of Commission?)
- Focus on medium term goal of debt reduction
- Operational target: primary net expenditure growth (EFB)
- Exploit market discipline for enforcement: excess debt must be junior
 - More costly, with larger haircuts at ECB and higher capital charges for banks
- Countries in violation to be excluded from risk sharing mechanisms

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
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Bank holdings of domestic sovereign bonds



Source: Lanotte and Tommasino 2018


Eurozone debt crisis: Core banks removed liquidity from periphery



Note: BIS Consolidated international banking statistics, Table B4: Consolidated claims of reporting banks on individual countries: foreign claims by nationality of reporting banks, ultimate risk basis. Eurozone core is Germany, France, Austria, Belgium and Netherlands. GIIPS is Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.



Peripheral banks buying sovereign bonds was a shock absorber



Note: Debt here consists of marketable debt only.



2. Amplification mechanisms are very hard to brake

- If D/Y high, “doom loop” cannot be avoided, even if banks held a diversified portfolio
 - Redenomination risk remains unless much more political integration;
 - Wealth tax and capital flight
 - Recession and NPL;
 - Sovereign is ceiling for corporate ratings (Almeida et al.)

Sovereign concentration charges?

- Benefit of portfolio diversification could be small, cost can be high
 - Mixed evidence that more diversified banks did better during the crisis, once control for nationality
 - Botondi et al. (*JEEA*): During 2011 growth of bank credit to private sector determined by *Nationality* of bank, *NOT* by portfolio composition
 - Sovereign risk assessed differently by domestic bank vs intl mkts
 - Domestic bank would not survive D default or Redenomination
 - Limited liability => Sovereign risk is discounted by domestic banks
- => Increased home bias during sudden stop reduces fire sales
- Implicit debt monetization providing liquidity to the sovereign
- Counter-cyclical concentration charges (relaxed during a crisis)?

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3. What purpose for European SDRM?

1. More orderly Debt Restructuring (DR)
2. Reduce time inconsistency of DR
 - in equilibrium DR comes too late, even if D unsustainable
 - this weakens mkt discipline, enhances moral hazard

=> *Make DR more likely* (conditional on high legacy D)

But.....D sustainability is endogenous (D runs)

- DR more likely => D runs also more likely

“Orderly” Debt Restructuring?

- When $D/Y > 130\%$ this is a joke
 - Lessons from debt restructuring of developing countries with mainly external debts not relevant for Eurozone
- D is issued under national law
 - *CAC reduced* the cost of borrowing !
 - Ex-Post, an international court would protect creditors, not debtors
- If serious about reducing cost of DR, remove CAC & increase ambiguity for D issued under national law
- More costly sovereign default is bad ex-post but good ex-ante

A Seniority Structure on Public Debt?

- Analogy with SIFI: issue equity-like instruments to achieve D reduction during crisis
 - Need external enforcement or intl coordination
- New debt should be junior, if in excess of pre-established path More expensive at the margin
- “Purple bonds” (consistent with pre-established path) and protected from ESM restructuring (Bini Smaghi 2018)
- Implicit juniority by indexation to *level of nominal GDP*
 - Stabilizing during crisis
 - Avoid explicit default (risk of contagion, political legitimacy)

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4. What role for ESM?

- ESM can only lend if D is sustainable, and this should not be changed
- But assessment of D Sustainability is difficult
 - Liquidity crisis more likely if weak fundamentals
- More proactive and rigid role for ESM in assessing D sustainability very risky
- Politically unacceptable with current ESM governance
 - ESM represents interests of creditor countries
 - What if used to extract concessions on other policy issues?

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5. The ECB

Monetary policy tools to manage a sudden stop

- OMT: why conditional on ESM program?
 - Independence of ECB and clear mandate should be enough

The inflation targeting framework

- Risk of being at $i = 0$ at next recession is high
 - Remove asymmetry in inflation goal and / or raise it ?
 - Price level targeting ?

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6. A Eurozone fiscal capacity?

Goals?

- Aggregate demand management if $i = 0$ or to cope with large asymmetric shocks

Tools:

1. Issue EZ debt – game changer but not politically feasible
2. Rainy day funds
 - Cost: asset accumulation (rather than D reduction)
 - Smaller benefit (small size), but still some benefit
 - Less risk of pro-cyclical fiscal policy

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7. What kind of Risk Sharing?

- What risks? **Large** vs small shocks
- Complete the Banking Union
 - EDIS, with higher charges on high D/Y countries but no additional constraints on portfolio composition of banks
 - SRF funded by ESM
- European Unemployment Insurance
 - Disbursements: Reinsurance vs **direct payments to individuals** (political / symbolic benefit for EZ image)

Summary

- Key problem left unresolved: economic divergence and high legacy debts
- Strengthen external constraints on fiscal policy to achieve faster reduction of legacy debts
- Avoid EZ reforms that create global instability
 - Proactive role of ESM;
 - Forced diversification of bank portfolios
- Get started with limited EZ fiscal capacity
- Complete Banking Union (fiscal backstop for SRF, EDIS)