# Over-indebtedness and poverty 

Patterns across household types and policy effects

Sarah Kuypers and Gerlinde Verbist<br>Herman Deleeck Centre for Social Policy, University of Antwerp

## 1. Introduction \& motivation

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- Significant increase in household debt since second half of $20^{\text {th }}$ century
- Household debt has become a natural source of finance for private households
- Life-cycle hypothesis (Ando \& Modigliani, 1963) / Permanent income hypothesis (Friedman, 1957)



## 1. Introduction \& motivation

- Yet, necessary to monitor that indebtedness does not spiral out of control
- Over-indebtedness can have negative consequences at micro level (financial, social, psychological, health) \& macro level (stability of financial system, overall economy)


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- Yet, necessary to monitor that indebtedness does not spiral out of control
- Over-indebtedness can have negative consequences at micro level (financial, social, psychological, health) \& macro level (stability of financial system, overall economy)
- Because of lack of a generally accepted definition, several types of overindebtedness indicators have been proposed:
- Administrative: extracted from judicial procedures, e.g. number of people on debt settlement
- Objective: evaluate extent to which debt is sustainable in terms of capacity to repay, e.g. debt-toincome ratio, debt-to-asset ratio, debt service-to-income ratio, number of loans people have
- Subjective: capture to which extent households themselves assess whether they are overindebted, e.g. asking whether they experience their debt repayments as a heavy burden, are having difficulties in making ends meet or are unable to face unexpected expenses

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## - We measure over-indebtedness in the poverty framework

- Cfr. type of objective indicator: defining capacity to repay as reaching a minimally acceptable living standard (i.e. poverty line) after debt repayments are fulfilled
- More widely accepted threshold
- Makes the link with social policy more explicit


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## - Only a couple of previous studies

- Carpentier \& Van den Bosch (2008) for Belgium, D’Alessio \& lezzi (2016; 2013) for Italy, Ntsalaze \& Ikhide (2016) for South Africa, Wałęga \& Wałęga (2021) for Poland


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- Partly due to fact that relationship is difficult to entangle: debt can be both cause \& consequence of poverty
- Partly due to lack of combined data on poverty \& debt


## 2. Data \& methods

- 4 waves of Belgian data of Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey
- Wave1: 2009 (income)-2010 (debt \& assets), Wave2: 2013-14, Wave3: 2016-17, Wave4: 2019-20
- Results pooled across 4 waves (results by wave in appendix of paper)
- Types of debt included: mortgage debt both for main residence and other real estate, nonmortgage debt including credit card debt, credit line/overdraft and other non-mortgage loans (no repayment information for credit card \& overdraft), no information on arrears
- Disposable incomes simulated using tax-benefit microsimulation model EUROMOD
- Taking into account (potential) leveraging through assets


## 2. Data \& methods

- Analysis is based on Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty indicators

$$
F G T_{0}=\frac{H}{N}: \text { poverty rate } \quad F G T_{1}=\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{H}\left(\frac{z-y_{i}}{z}\right): \text { poverty gap }
$$

Baseline: $y_{i}$
Subtracting debt repayments: $y_{i}-d r_{i}$
Including assets as leverage: $\left(y_{i}-y f a_{i}-y r a_{i}\right)-d r_{i}+\min \left(d r_{i},\left(f a_{i}+r a_{i}+h a_{i} * a n n\right)\right)$
(Additional cases in the paper)
$H=$ number of poor ( $y_{i}$ below $z$ ), $N=$ number of individuals, $z=$ poverty line ( $60 \%$ of median equivalised household disposable income), $y_{i}=$ equivalised household disposable income, $d r_{i}=$ debt repayments, $f a_{i}=$ financial assets, $y f a_{i}=$ income from financial assets, $r a_{i}=$ real assets other than the main house, $y r a_{i}=$ rental income, $h a_{i}=$ housing assets, ann $=\left[\frac{\rho}{1-(1+\rho)^{-n}}\right]$ with $\rho$ =interest rate and $n=$ life expectancy.

- Over-indebted: those not poor in baseline and poor in other specification OR poor in baseline and poverty gap increases in other specification


## 3. Results: indicators of over-indebtedness \& overlap

|  | Poor(er) | Poor(er) <br> asset <br> leverage | Loans <br> $>=4$ | Debt-to- <br> asset >=75 | Debt-to- <br> income $>=300$ | Debt service- <br> to-inc. $>=30$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Poor(er) | 13.2 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Poor(er) asset leverage | 3.6 | 3.6 |  |  |  |  |
| Loans >=4 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 2.0 |  |  |  |
| Debt-to-asset >=75 | 2.1 | 0.8 | 0.3 | 6.2 |  |  |
| Debt-to-income >=300 | 6.7 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 2.8 | 16.3 |  |
| Debt service-to-inc.>=30 | 8.0 | 1.8 | 1.2 | 2.1 | 10.2 | 14.8 |

## 3. Results: indicators of over-indebtedness \& overlap

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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## 3. Results: logit regression socio-demographics

|  | Poor(er) | Poor(er) asset leverage |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | Odds ratio | Sig. | Odds ratio | Sig. |
| Age (ref: 65+) |  |  |  |  |
| $18-34$ | 3.41 | $* * *$ |  |  |
| $35-54$ | 2.71 | ${ }^{* * *}$ |  |  |
| 55-64 | 2.38 | $* * *$ |  |  |
| Gender (ref: male) | 1.14 | n.s. |  |  |
| Education (ref: tertiary) |  |  |  |  |
| No or primary | 2.27 | $* * *$ |  |  |
| Secondary | 2.37 | $* * *$ |  |  |
| Labour status (ref: retired) |  |  |  |  |
| Employee | 0.43 | $* * *$ |  |  |
| Self-employed | 1.19 | n.s. |  |  |
| Unemployed | 1.27 | n.s. |  |  |
| Other | 0.89 | n.s. |  |  |
| Household type (ref: couple) |  |  |  |  |
| Single | 1.24 | n.s. |  |  |
| Single parent | 2.89 | $* * *$ |  |  |
| Couple with children | 1.17 | n.s. |  |  |
| Other | 1.64 | $* * *$ |  |  |
| Tenure status (ref: outright owner) |  |  |  |  |
| Owner with a mortgage | 12.23 | $* * *$ |  |  |
| Tenant/free user | 1.66 | $* *$ |  |  |
| Migrant background (ref: native) |  |  |  |  |
| Migrant from within EU | 1.37 | n.s. |  |  |
| Migrant from outside EU | 1.86 | $* * *$ |  |  |
| [Dummies for waves and constant not shown] |  |  |  |  |

## 3. Results: logit regression socio-demographics

|  | Poor(er) |  | Poor(er) asset leverage |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Odds ratio | Sig. | Odds ratio | Sig. |
| Age (ref: 65+) |  |  |  |  |
| $18-34$ | 3.41 | $* * *$ | 1.54 | n.s. |
| $35-54$ | 2.71 | $* * *$ | 1.65 | n.s. |
| 55-64 | 2.38 | $* * *$ | 1.98 | n.s. |
| Gender (ref: male) | 1.14 | n.s. | 0.99 | n.s. |
| Education (ref: tertiary) |  |  |  |  |
| No or primary | 2.27 | $* * *$ | 2.10 | $*$ |
| Secondary | 2.37 | $* * *$ | 2.09 | $* * *$ |
| Labour status (ref: retired) |  |  |  |  |
| Employee | 0.43 | $* * *$ | 0.53 | n.s. |
| Self-employed | 1.19 | n.s. | 1.19 | n.s. |
| Unemployed | 1.27 | n.s. | 2.11 | n.s. |
| Other | 0.89 | n.s. | 1.59 | n.s. |
| Household type (ref: couple) |  |  |  |  |
| Single | 1.24 | n.s. | 0.87 | n.s. |
| Single parent | 2.89 | $* * *$ | 0.50 | n.s. |
| Couple with children | 1.17 | n.s. | 0.83 | n.s. |
| Other | 1.64 | $* * *$ | 1.68 | $*$ |
| Tenure status (ref: outright owner) |  |  |  |  |
| Owner with a mortgage | 12.23 | $* * *$ | 6.68 | $* * *$ |
| Tenant/free user | 1.66 | $* *$ | 3.26 | $* * *$ |
| Migrant background (ref: native) |  |  |  |  |
| Migrant from within EU | 1.37 | n.s. | 1.75 | n.s. |
| Migrant from outside EU | 1.86 | $* * *$ | 1.58 | $*$ |
| [Dummies for waves and constant not shown] |  |  |  |  |

## 3. Results: comparison of income, debt \& assets

|  | Poor(er) |  | Poor(er) asset leverage |  | Loans > $=4$ |  | Debt-to-assetratio>=75 |  | Debt-to-income ratio>=300 |  | Debt service-toinc. ratio>=30 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Mean equivalised disposable income |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mean share of non-mortgage in total debt |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mean interest rate mortgage debt |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mean interest rate non-mortgage debt |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mean duration mortgage debt |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mean duration non-mortgage debt |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mean amount mortgage debt |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mean amount non-mortgage debt |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mean financial assets |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mean non-housing assets |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mean non-housing assets + annuity housing assets |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

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|  | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Mean equivalised disposable income | 27,349 | 14,010 | 25,022 | 10,814 | 23,982 | 26,174 | 24,393 | 20,331 | 25,100 | 21,659 | 25,481 | 20,316 |
| Mean share of non-mortgage in total debt | 20.9 | 26.9 | 21.2 | 38.1 | 22.4 | 22.5 | 20.7 | 41.1 | 29.1 | 6.9 | 25.1 | 15.3 |
| Mean interest rate mortgage debt |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mean interest rate non-mortgage debt |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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| Mean interest rate mortgage debt | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| Mean interest rate non-mortgage debt | 3.7 | 5.0 | 3.9 | 5.2 | 4.0 | 4.7 | 3.9 | 5.1 | 4.2 | 3.5 | 4.0 | 4.1 |
| Mean duration mortgage debt | 19 | 21 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 19 | 24 | 18 | 22 | 19 | 21 |
| Mean duration non-mortgage debt | 6 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 6 |
| Mean amount mortgage debt |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mean amount non-mortgage debt |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mean financial assets |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mean non-housing assets |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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| Mean duration mortgage debt | 19 | 21 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 19 | 24 | 18 | 22 | 19 | 21 |
| Mean duration non-mortgage debt | 6 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 6 |
| Mean amount mortgage debt | 127,345 | 151,094 | 133,560 | 123,065 | 134,055 | 109,542 | 128,373 | 203,731 | 101,472 | 190,010 | 113,683 | 175,576 |
| Mean amount non-mortgage debt | 21,452 | 16,540 | 20,821 | 12,700 | 20,158 | 18,995 | 20,332 | 18,355 | 17,082 | 32,577 | 18,944 | 23,293 |
| Mean financial assets |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mean non-housing assets |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mean non-housing assets + annuity housing assets |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

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|  | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Mean equivalised disposable income | 27,349 | 14,010 | 25,022 | 10,814 | 23,982 | 26,174 | 24,393 | 20,331 | 25,100 | 21,659 | 25,481 | 20,316 |
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| Mean amount non-mortgage debt | 21,452 | 16,540 | 20,821 | 12,700 | 20,158 | 18,995 | 20,332 | 18,355 | 17,082 | 32,577 | 18,944 | 23,293 |
| Mean financial assets | 49,482 | 22,451 | 44,056 | 25,789 | 43,356 | 29,067 | 46,183 | 4,854 | 48,911 | 28,706 | 46,785 | 32,347 |
| Mean non-housing assets | 109,202 | 109,387 | 104,727 | 171,687 | 106,171 | 188,637 | 117,278 | 18,459 | 115,398 | 94,984 | 95,079 | 146,716 |
| Mean non-housing assets + annuity housing assets | 114,822 | 114,447 | 110,236 | 176,794 | 111,665 | 193,814 | 123,028 | 20,911 | 120,664 | 100,965 | 100,197 | 153,161 |

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## 4. Policy simulations

- Focus in literature on policies:
- to increase financial literacy
- to regulate the terms and conditions of loans and consumer credit
- to improve judicial procedures for debt management and alleviation
- Link with social policy rarely made
- Exceptions: Angel \& Heitzman (2015) for EU \& Fisher (2005) for US
- Finding: higher unemployment benefits are correlated with lower over-indebtedness
- Measuring over-indebtedness in poverty framework makes (potential) link more explicit


## 4. Policy simulations

- Focus on 2 main risk factors: low disposable income \& ownership of non-mortgage debt
- Policy reform 1: consider debt repayments in social assistance benefit (leefloon)
- Means-test takes into account (income from) assets, lowering or excluding benefits (Marchal et al., 2021)
- Only seems fair to also account for debt repayments in that means-test
- Simulated in EUROMOD social assistance module
- Policy reform 2: debt restructuring
- Inspired by credit banks in NL and pilot project in Antwerp (https://www.samvzw.be/nieuws/schuldsanering-nederland-en-belgie-2-stad-antwerpen)
- Overindebted clients receive max. $€ 150$ per month to pay off their debt (mortgages not included)
- Simulated in Stata for those who are considered poor after asset leveraging and have a positive amount of non-mortgage debt


## 4. Policy simulations: impact on over-indebtedness



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## 4. Policy simulations: characteristics of those helped

|  | Helped reform 1 | Helped reform 1 asset leverage | Helped reform 2 | Helped reform 2 asset leverage | Poor(er) before reform | Poor(er) asset leverage before reform | Total population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Labour status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Employee | 16.6 | 23.9 | 13.2 | 23.4 | 30.3 | 22.4 | 36.5 |
| Self-employed | 5.6 | 10.2 | 0.5 | 2.5 | 7.0 | 5.8 | 3.7 |
| Unemployed | 16.3 | 11.3 | 25.2 | 18.1 | 7.2 | 10.8 | 5.0 |
| Retired | 2.7 | 3.8 | 8.2 | 10.9 | 5.5 | 8.5 | 20.7 |
| Other | 58.8 | 50.8 | 53.0 | 45.2 | 50.1 | 52.4 | 34.0 |
| Household type |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Single | 11.4 | 13.7 | 21.5 | 13.4 | 8.1 | 10.0 | 14.9 |
| Single parent | 4.7 | 3.3 | 6.0 | 1.5 | 5.9 | 1.6 | 2.8 |
| Couple | 9.4 | 4.8 | 26.1 | 23.8 | 12.9 | 15.7 | 26.0 |
| Couple with children | 17.8 | 17.9 | 13.2 | 15.9 | 29.0 | 19.7 | 22.4 |
| Other | 56.8 | 60.3 | 33.3 | 45.4 | 44.1 | 52.9 | 33.9 |
| Tenure status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Outright owner | 54.6 | 78.7 | 1.1 | 26.0 | 77.4 | 62.0 | 42.0 |
| Owner with a mortgage | 0.0 | 6.0 | 13.4 | 20.8 | 8.3 | 10.8 | 33.3 |
| Tenant/free user | 45.4 | 15.3 | 85.5 | 53.2 | 14.3 | 27.3 | 24.7 |
| Migrant background |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Native | 56.8 | 49.0 | 64.2 | 72.1 | 74.9 | 65.9 | 83.7 |
| Migrant from within EU | 4.6 | 5.0 | 5.2 | 10.3 | 6.4 | 9.2 | 5.8 |
| Migrant from outside EU | 38.7 | 45.9 | 30.6 | 17.6 | 18.8 | 24.8 | 10.5 |
| [Age, gender and education not shown] |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

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|  | Helped reform 1 | Helped reform 1 asset leverage | Helped reform 2 | Helped reform 2 asset leverage | Poor(er) before reform | Poor(er) asset leverage before reform | Total population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Labour status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Employee | 16.6 | 23.9 | 13.2 | 23.4 | 30.3 | 22.4 | 36.5 |
| Self-employed | 5.6 | 10.2 | 0.5 | 2.5 | 7.0 | 5.8 | 3.7 |
| Unemployed | 16.3 | 11.3 | 25.2 | 18.1 | 7.2 | 10.8 | 5.0 |
| Retired | 2.7 | 3.8 | 8.2 | 10.9 | 5.5 | 8.5 | 20.7 |
| Other | 58.8 | 50.8 | 53.0 | 45.2 | 50.1 | 52.4 | 34.0 |
| Household type |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Single | 11.4 | 13.7 | 21.5 | 13.4 | 8.1 | 10.0 | 14.9 |
| Single parent | 4.7 | 3.3 | 6.0 | 1.5 | 5.9 | 1.6 | 2.8 |
| Couple | 9.4 | 4.8 | 26.1 | 23.8 | 12.9 | 15.7 | 26.0 |
| Couple with children | 17.8 | 17.9 | 13.2 | 15.9 | 29.0 | 19.7 | 22.4 |
| Other | 56.8 | 60.3 | 33.3 | 45.4 | 44.1 | 52.9 | 33.9 |
| Tenure status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Outright owner | 54.6 | 78.7 | 1.1 | 26.0 | 77.4 | 62.0 | 42.0 |
| Owner with a mortgage | 0.0 | 6.0 | 13.4 | 20.8 | 8.3 | 10.8 | 33.3 |
| Tenant/free user | 45.4 | 15.3 | 85.5 | 53.2 | 14.3 | 27.3 | 24.7 |
| Migrant background |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Native | 56.8 | 49.0 | 64.2 | 72.1 | 74.9 | 65.9 | 83.7 |
| Migrant from within EU | 4.6 | 5.0 | 5.2 | 10.3 | 6.4 | 9.2 | 5.8 |
| Migrant from outside EU | 38.7 | 45.9 | 30.6 | 17.6 | 18.8 | 24.8 | 10.5 |

[Age, gender and education not shown]

## 4. Policy simulations: characteristics of those helped

|  | Helped reform 1 | Helped reform 1 asset leverage | Helped reform 2 | Helped reform 2 asset leverage | Poor(er) before reform | Poor(er) asset leverage before reform | Total population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Labour status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Employee | 16.6 | 23.9 | 13.2 | 23.4 | 30.3 | 22.4 | 36.5 |
| Self-employed | 5.6 | 10.2 | 0.5 | 2.5 | 7.0 | 5.8 | 3.7 |
| Unemployed | 16.3 | 11.3 | 25.2 | 18.1 | 7.2 | 10.8 | 5.0 |
| Retired | 2.7 | 3.8 | 8.2 | 10.9 | 5.5 | 8.5 | 20.1 |
| Other | 58.8 | 50.8 | 53.0 | 45.2 | 50.1 | 52.4 | 34.0 |
| Household type |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Single | 11.4 | 13.7 | 21.5 | 13.4 | 8.1 | 10.0 | 14.9 |
| Single parent | 4.7 | 3.3 | 6.0 | 1.5 | 5.9 | 1.6 | 2.8 |
| Couple | 9.4 | 4.8 | 26.1 | 23.8 | 12.9 | 15.7 | 26.0 |
| Couple with children | 17.8 | 17.9 | 13.2 | 15.9 | 29.0 | 19.7 | 22.4 |
| Other | 56.8 | 60.3 | 33.3 | 45.4 | 44.1 | 52.9 | 33.9 |
| Tenure status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Outright owner | 54.6 | 78.7 | 1.1 | 26.0 | 77.4 | 62.0 | 42.0 |
| Owner with a mortgage | 0.0 | 6.0 | 13.4 | 20.8 | 8.3 | 10.8 | 33.3 |
| Tenant/free user | 45.4 | 15.3 | 85.5 | 53.2 | 14.3 | 27.3 | 24.7 |
| Migrant background |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Native | 56.8 | 49.0 | 64.2 | 72.1 | 74.9 | 65.9 | 83.7 |
| Migrant from within EU | 4.6 | 5.0 | 5.2 | 10.3 | 6.4 | 9.2 | 5.8 |
| Migrant from outside EU | 38.7 | 45.9 | 30.6 | 17.6 | 18.8 | 24.8 | 10.5 |
| [Age, gender and education not shown] |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## 5. Conclusion

- Although household debt is a natural source of finance, monitoring over-indebtedness is necessary as it has negative consequences at micro and macro level
- Indicators defined within poverty framework differ with 'classical' indicators
- $13.2 \%$ become poor(er) when debt repayments subtracted from disposable income, falls to $3.6 \%$ once asset leveraging is taken into account; overlap with other indicators is relatively limited
- Captures combination of socio-demographic risk groups identified by other indicators
- Classical indicators mainly identify those who initially borrow large amounts as over-indebted, our indicators point towards low disposable income, a larger share of non-mortgage debt and the higher interest rate paid for that type of debt as the most important risk factors
- Policy implications
- Currently, social policy design hardly considers the role of debt in financial vulnerability, so there seems ample room for reforms in that regard
- During the COVID pandemic \& energy crisis the Belgian government decided together with the banking sector to allow households to postpone repayments of mortgage debt. Our results suggest that a similar policy for nonmortgage debt would be needed to support the most vulnerable.

Beleid Herman Deleeck

