

# The Long and Short of Financing Government Spending

Jochen Mankart, Romanos Priftis and Rigas Oikonomou

Discussion:

Fernando Broner  
*CREI, UPF, BSE*  
October 2022

## Summary

- Does the effect of fiscal expansions depend on whether they are financed with short- or long-term debt?

## Summary

- Does the effect of fiscal expansions depend on whether they are financed with short- or long-term debt?
- Yes! The size of the fiscal multiplier is higher for short-term debt financing

## Summary

- Does the effect of fiscal expansions depend on whether they are financed with short- or long-term debt?
- Yes! The size of the fiscal multiplier is higher for short-term debt financing
- The paper provides
  - strong empirical evidence
  - clear theoretical mechanism
  - quantitative results
  - policy implications

## Empirical evidence (I)

- Proxy-SVAR
  - run VAR with 4 variables:  $[G_t, Y_t, C_t, I_t]$
  - use proxy for exogenous government spending shocks
    - \* defense spending news

## Empirical evidence (I)

- Proxy-SVAR

- run VAR with 4 variables:  $[G_t, Y_t, C_t, I_t]$
- use proxy for exogenous government spending shocks
  - \* defense spending news

- Two shocks

$$\tilde{p}_t = \begin{bmatrix} \tilde{p}_{s,t} \\ \tilde{p}_{l,t} \end{bmatrix}$$

where

$\tilde{p}_{s,t} = \text{news}_t$  if  $R_t$  increases


$\tilde{p}_{l,t} = \text{news}_t$  if  $R_t$  decreases

and

$$R_t = \frac{b_{s,t}}{b_{l,t}}$$

- Namely, spending shocks are classified as short-term financed or long-term financed if
  - ratio of short- to long-term debt increases or decreases (I think...)

Figure 1: Proxy-SVAR: Baseline specification. Impulse response functions



Notes: Top panel: Impulse response functions following a shock to short-term (blue, dash-dotted) and long-term debt-financed (red, solid) government expenditures. Lines correspond to median responses. Shaded areas correspond to confidence bands of one standard deviation. Bottom panel: The difference in impulse response function between long-term and short-term debt financed government expenditures. Shaded areas correspond to confidence bands of one standard deviation.

## Empirical evidence (I)

- Why not use a non-binary classification? For example

$$\tilde{p}_t = \begin{bmatrix} \tilde{p}_{s,t} \\ \tilde{p}_{l,t} \end{bmatrix}$$

where

$$\tilde{p}_{s,t} = \text{news}_t \cdot \frac{\Delta b_{s,t}}{\Delta b_{s,t} + \Delta b_{l,t}}$$

$$\tilde{p}_{l,t} = \text{news}_t \cdot \frac{\Delta b_{l,t}}{\Delta b_{s,t} + \Delta b_{l,t}}$$



## Empirical evidence (I)

- Why not use a non-binary classification? For example

$$\tilde{p}_t = \begin{bmatrix} \tilde{p}_{s,t} \\ \tilde{p}_{l,t} \end{bmatrix}$$

where

$$\tilde{p}_{s,t} = \text{news}_t \cdot \frac{\Delta b_{s,t}}{\Delta b_{s,t} + \Delta b_{l,t}}$$

$$\tilde{p}_{l,t} = \text{news}_t \cdot \frac{\Delta b_{l,t}}{\Delta b_{s,t} + \Delta b_{l,t}}$$

- The figure suggests low power to identify investment responses
  - can you reject that the difference for  $I_t$  is as large as for  $Y_t$  and  $C_t$ ?

## Empirical evidence (I)

- The paper discusses an important concern
- The maturity of debt issuance can be endogenous
  - issue short-term debt when yield curve is upward sloping
  - but upward sloping yield curves predict economic expansions
- It is not completely clear than adding the term premium to the VAR is enough


## Empirical evidence (I)

- The paper discusses an important concern
- The maturity of debt issuance can be endogenous
  - issue short-term debt when yield curve is upward sloping
  - but upward sloping yield curves predict economic expansions
- It is not completely clear than adding the term premium to the VAR is enough
- I would like more information on the nature of shocks
  - is there any trend over time?
  - is there any cyclical?
  - plots of the shocks and of  $b_{s,t}/b_{l,t}$  would be nice

## Empirical evidence (II)

- Local projections
  - state-dependent effects of government spending shocks
  - now use change in  $b_{s,t}/b_{l,t}$  between  $t - 2$  and  $t - 1$

Figure 4: State-dependent local projections: Baseline specification. IRFs News shock.



Notes: Impulse response functions following a shock to short-term (blue) and long-term debt-financed (red) government expenditures. Lines correspond to median responses. Shaded areas correspond to confidence bands of one standard deviation. The specification includes the following control variables: GDP, private consumption, private investment, wages, long-term rate, and total debt, as well as their lags.

## Empirical evidence (II)

- The results for  $I_t$  now seem comparable to those for  $Y_t$  and  $C_t$
- I would like to see cumulative multipliers to facilitate comparison with results using proxy-SVAR

## Empirical evidence (II)

- The results for  $I_t$  now seem comparable to those for  $Y_t$  and  $C_t$
- I would like to see cumulative multipliers to facilitate comparison with results using proxy-SVAR

## Theoretical mechanism

- Short-term debt provides liquidity services
  - agents can increase consumption more easily if they hold short-term debt
  - fiscal expansion financed with short-term debt increases consumption



## Theoretical mechanism

- The model is reminiscent of a “repeated Diamond-Dybvig” framework

## Theoretical mechanism

- The model is reminiscent of a “repeated Diamond-Dybvig” framework
- Preferences

$$u(C_t^i) + \theta_t^i \cdot v(c_t^i)$$

where  $C_t^i$  and  $c_t^i$  denote consumption in sub-periods  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  and  $\theta_t^i$  is a random variable reflecting a liquidity shock

## Theoretical mechanism

- The model is reminiscent of a “repeated Diamond-Dybvig” framework
- Preferences

$$u(C_t^i) + \theta_t^i \cdot v(c_t^i)$$

where  $C_t^i$  and  $c_t^i$  denote consumption in sub-periods  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  and  $\theta_t^i$  is a random variable reflecting a liquidity shock

- Only short-term debt can be used to face liquidity shock

$$c_t^i \leq b_{s,t}^i$$

## Theoretical mechanism

- The model is reminiscent of a “repeated Diamond-Dybvig” framework

- Preferences

$$u(C_t^i) + \theta_t^i \cdot v(c_t^i)$$

where  $C_t^i$  and  $c_t^i$  denote consumption in sub-periods  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  and  $\theta_t^i$  is a random variable reflecting a liquidity shock

- Only short-term debt can be used to face liquidity shock

$$c_t^i \leq b_{s,t}^i$$

- Thus, an increase in  $b_{s,t}$  has a direct positive effect on consumption  $c_t$

## Theoretical mechanism

- Mechanism is clear and seems reasonable

## Theoretical mechanism

- Mechanism is clear and seems reasonable
- The assumption that  $c_t^i \leq b_{s,t}^i$  is very extreme
  - it works as a short-cut in a simple model
  - but it probably overstates the distinction between short- and long-term debt in the quantitative analysis

## Theoretical mechanism

- Mechanism is clear and seems reasonable
- The assumption that  $c_t^i \leq b_{s,t}^i$  is very extreme
  - it works as a short-cut in a simple model
  - but it probably overstates the distinction between short- and long-term debt in the quantitative analysis
- An empirical prediction?
  - for low levels of debt
    - \* debt maturity should be short-term because liquidity needs are high
    - \* fiscal multipliers with short-term financing should be much more expansionary
  - for high levels of debt
    - \* debt maturity should be long-term because liquidity needs are low
    - \* fiscal multipliers with short-term financing should not be very different

## Final comment

- Overall, this is a very convincing and relevant paper
- Preliminary, but has lots of potential!